n170501 nfoWorks nfoNote CryptoRNG: Random Number Generation

nfoWorks>notes> 2017>05> n170501>  0.0.0 2017-06-16 16:46 -0700

{Author Note: Boilerplate below here, to be replaced.}

Stream Cipher Equivocation (SCE) is an investigation into cryptographic constructions for personal use that offer ideal resistance to cryptanalytic attacks by a resourceful adversary.

Purpose

Identification and characterization of general-use stream ciphers and requirements for their long-term secure protection of private data.
  

Principles

 1. The approach is limited to the collection, storage, transfer, sharing, and dissemination of sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information. 
 2. NIST Federal Information Standards and Special Publications are accepted as guidelines and limitations on scope.

 3. Characterization of relationships between key strength, cipher creation, message equivocation, and adversary difficulty are clear and understandable.
 4. The limitation of cryptographic-quality pseudo-random number generators in creation of an ideal message-privacy envelope is made clear.
 5. Reliable transmission, storage, and access to the cryptogram and reliable operation of encryption/decryption are taken as given. Assurance of message integrity and authenticity is separate although not necessarily independent.
 6. Messages and their cryptograms are of fixed (not necessarily the same) lengths.

 7. The chunking of cryptogram segments is independent of blocking for transmission and storage.
 8. The scheme does not depend on work-factor multipliers that impact recipients and yield to foreseeable advances in technology and computational resources.
 9. The scheme is applicable to long-lived data for which an adversary has indefinite time to attack the protection.
 10. The scheme will not by itself defeat targeted espionage by non-cryptographic means.
  

Priorities

 1. Basic model and its characterization.
 2. Estimation of attack complexity in terms of external knowledge of procedure and message characteristics.

 3. Demonstration of simple approaches that delimit the weakest protection.
 4. Exploration of straightforward forms of "perpetual equivocation" on the basic scheme.
 5. Assessment of further equivocation-extending measures, their costs and their complexity.
 6. Any implemented algorithms.
 7. Statistical analysis of implementations.
 8. Forensic recovery methods.
  

Plans

1. Gather foundational materials from information theory.
2. Express the fundamental stream cipher case, its parameters, and prospective vulnerabilities.
3. Connect the information-theoretic characteristics to the risk of cryptographic discovery of the message.
4. Assess methods, such as perpetual equivocation, as impediments to message discovery.
5. Progress farther based on the identified prospects.
  

People

 1. The explanations and examples are intended for study by developers and those interested in understanding stream cipher (equivocation) concepts.
 2. The findings are offered to experts for their review and skeptical assessments.
 3. The basic analysis work is a solo effort with potential review/contribution on public lists devoted to cryptography and information security.

1. Introduction

2. Available Materials and References

• n170501b: CryptoRNG Development [Latest]
     
• n170501c: SCE Background
• n170501a: Diary & Job Jar
• n170501-assets: Assets used/cited for CryptoRNG Development  
    
• n130101: NIST Cryptographic Resources
  Additional assets and guidance used in the characterization of CryptoRNG approaches
   

Attribution:

Hamilton, Dennis E.

CryptoRNG: Random Number Generation.   nfoWorks nfoNote folio n170501 0.0.0, June 16, 2017.  Accessed at <http://nfoWorks.org/notes/2017/05/n170501.htm>.

Revision History:
 

0.0.0 2017-06-16-12:12 Cover Page for Initial Material

Serve as placeholder.  Also start a job jar page for recording work items for building more content. 

You are navigating nfoWorks. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.

created 2017-05-06 -0700 $$Author: Orcmid $ $$Date: 17-06-16 16:49 $ $$Revision: 201 $